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Sustainability certification schemes are a key way for  mining companies to be held 
accountable. But how effective are these schemes?
40% of the schemes do not define minimum requirements of compliance 
and establish consequences and sanctions for situations of non-compliance
Only  20% of the schemes have a mechanism for periodic evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the schemes in place
80% of schemes use third-party assurance process to ensure compliance 
and 67% accredit the assurance providers
Only 1 scheme had its annual report audited by an external auditor
87% of schemes cross-reference other standards within their own standards 
or guidelines
Highlights
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53% of the schemes only provided information on their official website 
in English, with 33% of schemes providing their guideline documents only in 
English, even though most of the schemes operated globally
40% of the schemes make available to the public the assurance statements 
or the results of the assurance process
53% have stakeholder representatives playing an oversight role in the 
governance and management of the schemes. However, 50% of those schemes 
did not publicly disclose how those representatives are selected
60% incorporated the concept of chain of custody within their scope
40% of the schemes analysed did not provide public information about 
how decision makers are chosen
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Executive Summary
Certification schemes are one key means for civil society actors to hold mineral companies to account and for 
companies to demonstrate that they are operating responsibly. This research report identifies the full range of planned 
and operational schemes applicable to the mining, minerals and metals industries and their supply chains and analyses 
the design characteristics of those schemes, including the: objectives, focus, process for standards development and 
operation. Fifteen schemes are analysed. The design characteristics under analysis were determined from a review of 
academic literature on sustainability standards and their effectiveness. 
This report represents the first stage of an applied research project looking into the effectiveness of certification schemes 
in the mineral industry and the potential role sustainability certification schemes can play to improve standards for 
responsible mining. The research is being undertaken by the Centre for Social Responsibility in Mining (CSRM) at The 
University of Queensland and funded by the Tiffany & Co. Foundation through a grant to the University of Queensland 
in America. 
Previous studies on the specific topic of sustainability certification schemes suggest that there are few studies about 
certification schemes that have documented outcomes sufficient to determine what effects occurred and whether they 
are attributable to certification schemes. In particular, how the different design characteristics of different sustainability 
certification schemes can work to improve environmental and social outcomes.
The 15 schemes analysed during the first stage of this project were classified considering three different categories 
of schemes: (1) a ‘certified standard’, where the scheme fully determines how the standard should be assured; (2) an 
“assured standard’, where the standard should be assured but the scheme does not fully determine how the standard 
should be assured; or (3) an “non-assured standard”, where participants apply the standard but assurance is not 
compulsory. According to this classification, the vast majority of the schemes analysed in this report were classified as 
a “certified standard” (86%). One scheme was classified as “assured standard” (7%) and one scheme was classified as 
“non-assured standard” (7%).
The analysis presented in this report is based on publicly available information, validated by representatives of 8 of the 
15 schemes analysed. Some of the key findings from this report are: 
•	 The majority of the schemes are voluntary standards (73%), with a global geographic scope (Section 2.1).
•	 The thematic scope of the standards are dominated by social issues, followed by governance and the 
environment (Section 2.1.3). 
•	 The majority of schemes are new, with 73% of the schemes becoming operative within the last four years 
or planned to become operative in the next two years. Furthermore, the time to establish, develop and 
launch the schemes differed significantly among the schemes analysed. This time difference demonstrates 
how challenging it can be to negotiate and achieve consensus amongst different stakeholders1 when a multi-
stakeholder approach is adopted (Section 2.1.1).
•	 There was evidence of interaction and support between schemes, with some new schemes using established 
schemes as templates and receiving assistance from already established schemes during the start-up phase. 
A vast majority of schemes (87%) cross-reference other standards within their own standards or guidelines; 
however few (33%) recognise the certificates, labels or claims provided by other schemes within their own 
processes (Sections 2.1.1 and 2.2.3).
•	 There was variation as to whether the standards used a ‘chain of custody’ approach. Of the schemes analysed 
60% incorporated the concept of chain of custody within their scope, with the remaining 40% focussed solely 
1 Stakeholder is any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organisation’s objectives (Freeman 
1984).  Freeman, R. E. (1984). “Strategic management: A stakeholder approach.” Advances in strategic management 1(1): 31-60.
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on the mining or processing stages (Section 2.2.2).
•	 The decision-makers of schemes varied, with 33% of schemes consisting of decision-makers dominated by 
industry representatives, 33% with multi-stakeholder representatives, 13% with government representatives. 
Information on the decision makers was unavailable for three schemes (20%; Section 2.2.5).
•	 Public information on some aspects of governance and accountability lacked transparency for a significant 
number of schemes. For instance 40% of the schemes analysed did not provide public information about how 
decision makers are chosen, 67% of the schemes did not provide public information about how long decision 
makers occupy their position, and 33% of the schemes did not make the names of the decision makers publicly 
available (Section 2.2.5). Only a slight majority (53%) publicly disclosed financial information about the scheme, 
with 34% of the schemes disclosing their financial information through annual reports. Only one scheme had 
its annual report audited by an external auditor. A minority of schemes (40%) provide information in the public 
domain on the costs associated with participation in the scheme (Section 2.2.22 and 2.2.23).
•	 The slight majority of the schemes (53%) have stakeholder representatives playing an oversight role in the 
governance and management of the schemes. However, 50% of those schemes did not publicly disclose 
how those representatives are selected, 75% did not disclose how long those representatives occupied their 
position, and 57% did not make the names of those representatives publicly available (Section 2.2.6).
•	 In general it was difficult to find important details about the design characteristics of many of the schemes 
analysed from publicly available information. For example: 27% of the schemes did not provide detailed 
information about the existence of periodic revision of the standard; 47% of the schemes did not provide 
detailed information about whether stakeholders were involved in the development phase of the scheme; 73% 
of the schemes that did engage stakeholders during the development phase did not disclose the identity of 
the stakeholders who were engaged; and, only 40% of the schemes make available to the public the assurance 
statements or the results of the assurance process (Sections 2.2.7, 2.2.8 and 2.2.15).
•	 The most common form of stakeholder engagement undertaken by the schemes analysed was to release the 
standard for public consultation during the development phase of the scheme (44%), followed by workshops 
and roundtables (28%), face-to-face meetings (22%) and regular teleconferences (6%; Section 2.2.8).
•	 Most of the schemes (60%) did not provide information about the existence of initiatives implemented to 
support internal or external stakeholders to participate in the development of the scheme or in the revision 
process. In addition, even though most of the schemes operated globally, 53% of the schemes only provided 
information on their official website in English, with 33% of schemes providing their guideline documents only 
in English (Section 2.2.9).
•	 A minority of schemes (33%) have a contact point for forwarding complaints, with a smaller number still (13%) 
publically disclosing the existence of a formal complaints and dispute resolution mechanism (Section 2.2.10).
•	 A slight majority of schemes (53%) were developed based on the ISEAL guidelines or are full members of ISEAL 
(Section 2.2.12).
•	 The vast majority of schemes analysed (80%) use third-party assurance processes to ensure compliance, with 
40% of the schemes undertaking assurance processes on a yearly basis. Also, the vast majority of schemes 
(80%) provide guidance for the assurance process, such as definitions about the scope of the assurance, and 
procedures or protocols for the assurance process (Sections 2.2.12, 2.2.13 and 2.2.14).
•	 The majority of schemes (67%) accredit the assurance providers, 27% perform a quality review of the assurance 
process (and only issue the certificate, claim or label after this review), 13% provide criteria for the assurance 
provider to ensure quality, and 13% designate the assurance providers authorized to perform assurance 
services (Section 2.2.16).
•	 A range of support initiatives were identified to assist participants, assurers or other stakeholders in the 
assurance process. For example, 27% of the schemes provide training material for scheme participants about 
how to be prepared for assurance processes and how to conduct self-assessments, 27% provide financial 
support for early adopters or scheme participants with financial constraints, 20% encourage shared assurance 
and the use of local assurance providers to reduce costs, and 7% suggest the use of materiality to streamline 
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the assurance process (Section 2.2.18).
•	 The slight majority of the schemes assessed (60%) define minimum requirements of compliance and establish 
consequences and sanctions for situations of non-compliance (Section 2.2.19 and 2.2.21).
•	 The slight majority of schemes analysed (60%) did not provide detailed information about efforts to foster 
and improve the level of compliance of participants, especially new starters and participants with financial or 
technical constraints (Section 2.2.10).
•	 Only 20% of the schemes analysed have a mechanism for periodic evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
schemes, with a further 20% of schemes currently developing a process for periodic evaluation (Section 2.2.24).
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1. Introduction
In the past decade the mining industry has attempted to strengthen their corporate policies, increase their engagement 
with government, civil society and community actors, and improve their professional capability to respond to 
environmental and social challenges. But doubt still persists in the minds of those outside the minerals industry about 
the authenticity of such change. There is also increasing concern from civil society actors about the dramatic shifts 
in the scale, technology and location of mineral developments. Certification schemes are increasingly being used by 
minerals companies as a tool to demonstrate that they are operating responsibly. Some schemes may also be used by 
civil society actors to hold mineral companies to account and for companies to demonstrate that they are operating 
responsibly. But how effective are they? And with the recent proliferation of different schemes, could they work 
together to lift the sustainability standards of the sector as a whole? 
This applied research project will investigate the potential role sustainability certification schemes (schemes2) can 
play to improve standards for responsible mining. The project will review the design characteristics of proposed and 
existing schemes to develop practical resources and recommendations for how certification schemes can work to 
improve environmental and social outcomes. The project will assist civil society, business and governments to ensure 
that standards for the responsible mining of precious metals and gemstones lead to improvements in the performance 
of the mineral sector. 
The specific objectives of the project are to:
•	 Identify the full range of planned and operational schemes applicable to the mineral industry and their supply 
chains and compare their design characteristics, such as: objectives, focus, process for standards development 
and operation of such schemes;
•	 Analyse the effectiveness of different design characteristics of schemes, and the collective effectiveness of 
schemes in the mineral industry as a whole;
•	 Undertake in-depth analysis and fieldwork to consider the relationship between design characteristics and 
scheme outcomes; and
Produce guidance material that captures the findings from all of the above, to support mineral operations, assurance 
providers, standards organisations, civil society groups, investors, and resource communities to improve practice and 
outcomes.
The project uses a mixed-method approach, including three consecutive stages: (1) desktop analysis; (2) semi-structured 
interviews and focus groups; and (3) field research and comparative analysis. This report refers to the stage one of this 
research project, which is an analysis of the design characteristics of selected sustainability certification schemes in the 
minerals sector through a desktop review. 
The report starts by outlining the methods used in this first stage of the study and the schemes under analysis. Section 
2 provides an overview of the selected schemes and a description of the design characteristics. Section 3 concludes 
the report. 
1.1 Method
The research methods employed during the first stage (desktop review) of this research combined literature review, 
desktop review, and validation with representatives of the schemes. The literature review identified the design 
characteristics that have an influence on the effectiveness of sustainability standards and from this review a list of key 
2  In this report we use the term sustainability certification schemes (schemes) to refer to all of the types of certification schemes 
and standards that address governance, social and/or environmental issues, and provide  a claim, standard or certificate attesting 
to compliance.
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design characteristics was developed. The desktop review accessed publicly available information (from documents, 
reports and official webpages) about the design characteristics of 15 sustainability certification schemes in the mineral 
industry. This information was then validated with representatives of the schemes who were identified from the official 
website of the schemes or additionally through personal networks. The scheme representatives were contacted by 
email and invited to provide missing information and validate information obtained from the schemes’ official websites. 
When specific representatives could not be identified, the request was forwarded to the official contact email of the 
scheme. Representatives of the 15 schemes were contacted by email between 19th September and 23 October 2014. 
If the first information request email was not answered, the same email was sent again. Eight schemes validated 
the information gathered from publicly available material. Two schemes partially provided missing information, and 
five schemes did not reply to the information request emails. Once the information was validated by the scheme 
representatives an analysis of the design characteristics of the 15 schemes was performed. 
1.1.1 Limitations 
This report is neither a performance assessment nor an audit to test or assess the design characteristics of the 15 
certification schemes under analysis. All of the information obtained from official documents, and verification of our 
interpretation of that information was sought from scheme representatives. While some information was verified by 
the scheme representatives, no further assessment or test to guarantee the veracity or quality of the information was 
undertaken. 
The research is not a comparison or ranking of schemes, but an analysis of the design characteristics of schemes. We 
have endeavoured to be objective in our analysis and presentation of the information in order to offer a useful resource 
to enhance practice in the field of sustainability certification in the mining sector. In addition, due to the small sample 
used, statistical analyses in this report must be carefully interpreted and could not be generalised to a broader context 
based on this research project alone. The statistical analyses provided aim to illustrate where the certification schemes 
are in relation to the design characteristics rather than develop statistically significant conclusions.
1.1.2 Sample
•	 A purposive selection technique was applied to identify and select schemes to be assessed during the first 
stage of this research project. Purposive selection techniques are typically designed to select a small number 
of participants that will provide more information about a particular phenomenon and lead to greater depth 
of information from a smaller number of selected participants (Teddlie and Yu 2007, Teddlie and Yu 2007, 
Bloomberg and Volpe 2012). As a result of the purposive selection technique the following 15 schemes were 
selected:
•	 Aluminium Stewardship Initiative (ASI);
•	 Bettercoal Code (BC);
•	 Conflict-Free Gold Standard (CFGS);
•	 Conflict-Free Smelter Program (CFSP);
•	 Development Diamonds Standards (DDS);
•	 Fairmined  Standard for Gold and Associated Precious Metals (Fairmined);
•	 Fairtrade Standard for Gold and Associated Precious Metals (Fairtrade);
•	 Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA);
•	 International Cyanide Management Code  (ICMC);
•	 International Standards Organization 14001 (ISO 14001);
•	 ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi);
•	 Kimberley Process (KP);
•	 Mineral Certification Scheme of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR);
•	 Responsible Jewellery Council Code of Practices (RJC); and
•	 Responsible Steel Stewardship (RSS).
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2. Findings
2.1 Features of the selected schemes
This section provides an overview of the features of the 15 schemes analysed in this research project. The six features 
of the schemes are as follows:
•	 Names;
•	 Description and objectives;
•	 Commodities or activities; 
•	 Geographic scope;
•	 Thematic scope; and
•	 Type of enforcement.
2.1.1 Name and description of the schemes
Table 1 lists the 15 schemes under analysis providing the name of each scheme and a summarised description of its 
objective.
Name Objective
Aluminium Steward-
ship Initiative (ASI)
The ASI aims to design a standard that can be both a tool for responsible sourcing of aluminium, and a material 
stewardship collaborative framework to improve the overall sustainability performance of the entire value chain of 
aluminium-containing products.
Bettercoal Code (BC)
BC is a global, not-for-profit membership-based organisation set up to advance continuous improvement of corporate 
social responsibility, including social, environmental and ethical practices, in the coal supply chain. 
Conflict-Free Gold 
Standard (CFGS)
CFGS provides a mechanism by which gold producers can assess and provide assurance that their gold has been ex-
tracted in a manner that does not cause, support or benefit unlawful armed conflict or contribute to serious human 
rights abuses or breaches of international humanitarian law.
Conflict-Free Smelter 
Program (CFSP)
The CFSP is a voluntary initiative in which an independent third party audits smelter or refiner procurement and toll-
ing activities and determines if the smelter or refiner demonstrated that all the minerals they processed originated 
from conflict-free sources. 
Development 
Diamonds Standards 
(DDS)
The DDS is an effort to help ensure that the most vulnerable group of diamond miners (Artisanal Diamond Miners 
and their communities) are not overlooked in the broader process of promoting ethical certification and responsible 
supply chains.
Fairmined  Standard 
for Gold and Associ-
ated Precious Metals 
(Fairmined)
Fairmined aims to promote the progressive organisation and formalisation of the Artisanal and Small-Scale Mining 
(ASM) sector, bringing with it improved labor rights, safer working conditions for miners, and strengthened miners’ 
organizations with the capacity to campaign for legislation and public policies that promote their rights and enable a 
responsible ASM sector.
Fairtrade Standard 
for Gold and Associ-
ated Precious Metals 
(Fairtrade)
Fairtrade aims to create opportunities for ASM miners and their communities promoting the formalisation of the ASM 
sector through the establishment of ASM organisations, bringing with it improved working conditions for producers, 
strengthened producer organisations with the capacity to lobby for legislation and public policies that promote a 
responsible ASM sector, improved environmental management, social security, gender equality, child protection and 
the elimination of child labour in mining communities, the well-being of families and children, fairer market access, 
benefits to local communities in mineral rich ecosystems, and improved governance to this sector.
Initiative for Respon-
sible Mining Assurance 
(IRMA)
IRMA aims to establish a third-party independent assurance system and develop standards that improve the social 
and environmental performance of industrial mining operations. 
International Cyanide 
Management Code  
(ICMC)
The ICMC is a voluntary initiative for the gold mining industry and the producers and transporters of the cyanide used 
in gold mining.  The objective of this program is to improve the industry’s performance in its management of cyanide, 
and to provide a framework of assurance for the industry’s stakeholders.
International Stan-
dards Organization 
14001 (ISO14000)
The ISO 14001 addresses aspects of environmental management systems. It provides practical tools for organisations 
looking to identify and control their environmental impact and constantly improve their environmental performance. 
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Name Objective
ITRI Tin Supply Chain 
Initiative (iTSCi)
The iTSCi is a due diligence process designed to address conflict mineral concerns existing within the international 
supply chain. The iTSCi system aims to meet the needs of companies wishing to maintain trade with responsible 
supply chain actors in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and adjoining countries, as well as to meet due 
diligence expectations of the international community in terms of guidance from the United Nations (UN), The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and national laws such as the Dodd Frank Act in 
the United States (US).
Kimberley Process (KP)
KP is a certification scheme that aims to stem the flow of rough diamonds (conflict diamonds3) used by rebel 
movements to finance wars against legitimate governments.
Mineral Certification 
Scheme of the Interna-
tional Conference on 
the Great Lakes Region 
(ICGLR)
The ICGLR aims to provide for sustainable conflict-free mineral chains in and between member states of the Inter-
national Conference on the Great Lakes Region with a view to eliminating support to armed groups that sustain or 
prolong conflict, and/or otherwise engage in serious human rights abuses.
Responsible Jewel-
lery Council Code of 
Practices (RJC)
The RJC aims to provide a common standard, based on international standards for responsible business practices, 
to advance responsible ethical, social and environmental practices, which respect human rights, throughout the 
diamond, gold and platinum group metals jewellery supply chain, from mine to retail.
Responsible Steel 
Stewardship (RSS)
RSS aims to provide consumer confidence in the responsible practices of organisations and their products within the 
steel supply chain to the Australian market including mining, steelmaking, steel product manufacture, fabrication and 
coating, use, bi-products and recycling. 
Table 1: Name and description of the schemes.3
2.1.2 Commodity and geographic scope
Table 2 lists the respective commodities and activities operated by them, and the geographic areas where those 
schemes operate.
Name Commodity / Activity Geographic Area
ASI Aluminium Worldwide
BC Coal Worldwide
CFGS Gold Worldwide
CFSP Tantalum, Tin, Tungsten and Gold Worldwide
DDS Diamonds Africa and South America
Fairmined Gold and Associated Precious Metals Latin America, Caribbean, Africa, Asia and Oceania
Fairtrade Gold and Associated Precious Metals Developing Countries
IRMA
All kinds of industrial mining (except mining operations 
that produce fuels for energy generation)
Worldwide
ICMC Cyanide and Gold Worldwide
ISO 14001 Environmental Management System Worldwide
iTSCi Tin
Africa Great Lakes Region (Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia)
KP Diamonds Worldwide
ICGLR
Gold, Cassiterite (Tin), Worlframite (Tungsten) and Coltan 
(Colombo-Tantalite)
Africa Great Lakes Region (Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, 
Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Uganda, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania and Zambia)
RJC Diamonds, Gold and Platinum Group Metals Worldwide
RSS Steel Australia
Table 2: Commodity or activity and geographic area operated by the scheme.
3  Conflict diamonds refers to rough diamonds that are used by rebel movements to finance their military activities, including 
attempts to undermine or overthrow legitimate Governments United Nations (2001). Resolution adopted by the General Assembly. 
G. Assembly. Geneva. A/RES/55/56.
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The slight majority of schemes operate globally (nine out of 15; 60%). However many emphasise developing world 
contexts. Africa was specifically mentioned by four schemes (27%), South America by two schemes (13%), and 
Asia, Oceania, Central America and Asia were mentioned once. One scheme only operates in Australia, however a 
representative of the scheme indicated that depending on the success of the scheme there was the potential for the 
geographic scope to be expanded. Two schemes only operate in the Great Lakes Region, Africa.
2.1.3 Thematic scope
Three themes were identified: Governance, Environment and Social. In addition, for each one of the three main themes, 
sub-items were observed. Figure 1 presents the three themes, their respective sub-items and the number of schemes 
that included the sub-item within their scope.
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Figure 1: Thematic areas covered by the schemes
Social aspects (blue columns) were the most common of the themes, followed by governance (orange columns) and 
the environment (green columns). The most commonly addressed social sub-item was Human Rights, covered by 11 
schemes (73%). Occupational Health & Safety was the second most addressed sub-item in this category covered by 
10 schemes (67%), followed by Conflict-Free4, Indigenous Peoples and Community Development, covered by nine 
schemes each (60%). Labour Rights was the social sub-item least commonly addressed, covered by eight schemes 
(53%).
4 The term Conflict-Free used in this research refers to natural resources ethically sourced.
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In Governance theme, Policy & Management was the most commonly addressed governance sub-item, covered by 
11 schemes (73%), followed by Material Stewardship, with 10 schemes (67%). Legal compliance was covered by nine 
schemes (60%) and Transparency & Disclosure by eight (53%). The least commonly addressed governance sub-item 
was Business Integrity & Ethics, addressed by six schemes (40%).
The Environment theme was the least commonly addressed of the themes. The sub-items Effluents & Waste and 
Biodiversity Conservation were the most commonly addressed Environment sub-items, covered by 10 schemes (67%) 
and nine schemes (60%), respectively. Mine Rehabilitation & Closure was addressed by six schemes (40%) and Water 
addressed by five schemes (33%). The least common Environment sub-item was Air Emissions, mentioned by only four 
of the schemes (27%).
Although schemes more commonly included Governance and Social sub-items within their scope, two specific 
Environmental sub-items were used by the majority of the schemes: Effluents & Waste and Biodiversity Conservation 
were considered by 10 (67%) and nine (60%) of the schemes, respectively. 
2.1.4 Type of enforcement
The analysis considered whether the schemes were voluntary or mandatory. Voluntary certification schemes are those 
in which participants adopt the scheme voluntarily due to a business, reputation or other driver. Mandatory schemes 
are requirements of membership to an industry association or legislated by governments. Figure 2 shows that 11 
schemes (73%) were identified as voluntary and with four (27%) mandatory schemes. Three of the mandatory schemes 
were regulated by governments and one was a mandatory requirement of an industry association.
  
Voluntary Mandatory
11 (73%)
4 (27%)
Figure 2: Percentage of voluntary and mandatory schemes.
Volunt Mandatory
11 (73%)
4 (27%)
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2.2 Design characteristics of the selected schemes
After an extensive literature review 24 design characteristics of sustainability certification schemes were identified. 
Table 3 lists these characteristics. 
Aspect Description
Established period Date in which schemes were established and launched.
Chain of custody Extent to which schemes consider the concept of chain of custody within its scope.
Interoperability Whether schemes recognise or reference any other initiative, standard or scheme within its own process.
Type of standards5
Type of standards used by schemes (“performance based”, where the behaviour or outcome expected is 
specifically outlined, “management-system based” where the scheme measures the processes an entity 
has in place to manage a particular issue, or a “combined approach”).
Governance structure Type of governance structure implemented by the schemes.
External entity with oversight of 
the scheme
Whether there are stakeholder representatives playing an oversight role in the governance of the 
schemes.
Revision process Whether schemes have a periodic revision process in place.
Stakeholder involvement in 
development of the scheme
Whether stakeholder representatives were engaged during the development phase of the schemes.
Support for participation in  de-
velopment and governance
Whether schemes have actions in place to support internal or external stakeholders to participate in the 
development of the schemes, the decision-making processes, or the revision of the standards.
Complaints and conflict resolu-
tion mechanisms
Whether schemes have complaints and conflict resolution mechanisms in place.
Membership of peak standard 
setting body
Whether schemes are members or have been certified by any international association that guides 
schemes development (ISEAL-Alliance, ISO, etc.).
Type of assurance Type of assurance process adopted (“first-party”, “second-party”, or “third-party”)6.
Assurance frequency How often the assurance process is conducted.
Assurance guidance
Whether schemes provide guidance about the assurance process (guidance determining scope, proce-
dures, protocols and assurance statement that should be applied and used by assurers during assurance 
processes, etc.).
 Public availability of assurance 
material
Whether the name of the assurers, the assurance report and the assurance statement are publicly avail-
able.
Assurance oversight
Whether schemes have actions implemented to oversee the quality of the assurance provided (accredita-
tion of assurers, quality review, etc.). 
Assurance payment The entity responsible for the costs involved with the assurance process.
Support for  
assurance process
Whether schemes have actions in place to support scheme participants, assurers or other stakeholders in 
the assurance process, and describe actions to make the assurance process affordable to scheme partici-
pants.
Compliance Whether schemes have established minimum requirements to determine compliance. 
Support for compliance
Whether schemes have actions implemented to foster and improve the level of compliance of participants 
(especially new starters and participants with financial or technical constraints). 
Consequences of non-compli-
ance and sanctions
Whether schemes have established consequences and/or sanctions in situations of non-compliance.
Public financial disclosure
Whether schemes provide public disclosure of financial information (e.g. scheme cost, funding, member-
ship fees, accounts). 
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Aspect Description
Public information about costs
Whether schemes provide public information about the costs associated with the schemes for partici-
pants (membership, certification fees, assurance, annual fees, etc.).
Effectiveness
Whether schemes have mechanisms implemented to evaluate their effectiveness (activities implemented 
to monitor, measure and/or assess impacts and outcomes of the scheme).
Table 3: List of the design characteristics assessed in this research project.5,6
The following sections present results of the analysis of the 15 schemes against the 24 design characteristics. Results 
are presented by design characteristic. 
2.2.1 Establishment period
This design characteristic refers to the dates in which schemes were established and launched. Figure 3 presents details 
about the establishment period of the 15 schemes assessed in this research project.
 
1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011 2013 2015 2017  
ASI
Fairtrade
Fairmined
BC
RSS
CFGS
iTSCi
ICGLR
DDS
CFSP
IRMA
RJC
ICMC
KP
ISO 14001
Established/Launched Operative
Figure 3: Establishment period. 
5 This research project adopts the definition of a standard used by Barry, Cashore et al. Barry, M., et al. (2012). Toward Sustain-
ability: The roles and limitations of certification. Washington, RESOLVE, Inc.: “standards are a defined set of social, environmental, 
and/or economic criteria”.
6 First-party assurance is the assessment performed by the person or organisation that provides the object under assurance, second-
party assurance is the assessment performed by a person or organisation that has a user interest in the object under assurance, 
and third-party assurance is the assessment performed by a person or body that is independent of the person or organisation that 
provides the object under assurance, and of user interests in that object under assurance (adapted from ISO and IEC International 
Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission (2004). Conformity assessment - vocabulary and 
general principles. Genève.
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It is clear from Figure 3 that the majority of the schemes were launched recently. Apart from one scheme that was 
launched in 1992 (ISO 14001), all schemes became operative or will become operative between 2003 and 2016. 
Eleven schemes (73%) became operative in the last four years or will become operative in the next two years. Those 
results support the findings of previous studies that refer to sustainability certification schemes as a new area of 
practice7. Four schemes, ASI, IRMA, iTCSCi and RSS are currently under development.  
The time to establish, develop and launch a scheme differed significantly among the schemes assessed in this research 
project. For instance, IRMA was established in 2006 and is still under development while the BC was established in 
2011 and launched in 2012.  On average, the time between the establishment and launch of the schemes was found 
to be 3.5 years.  
Schemes face a number of trade offs during their establishment period. Schemes that chose to involve diverse 
stakeholders in the development of the scheme must negotiate the different concerns, expectations and interests, of 
those constituents. This may account for some of the time differences observed in the establishment of the schemes 
under analysis. On the one hand, the more time you have to discuss and develop the scheme and achieve consensus 
the more prepared a scheme may be on implementation. On the other hand, a long development process could impact 
the credibility of the scheme under development, as stakeholders involved may lose interest. Furthermore, many 
design and implementation issues can be worked through during the initial years of operation of the scheme. 
The potential for schemes to have a long establishment period has led at least one author to argue for supplementary 
forms of governance to address matters of concern in the interim, while schemes are established. Global Witness 
(2012) argued that to address the issue of conflict minerals in Africa, the idea of supply chain due diligence should be 
supported. These due diligence processes would be conducted by downstream organisations as a quicker instrument to 
tackle the trade of conflict minerals in Africa while regulatory frameworks and institutional infrastructure is established.
The ISEAL Alliance (2010) has issued guidance on how to establish certification schemes. The guidance deals with 
topics such as: the development of terms of reference and a public summary of the development process; stakeholder 
mapping; the establishment of mechanisms to ensure a balance of interests during the stakeholder engagement and 
decision making processes (including phases of public consultation, taking stakeholders’ comments into account and 
provide accountability about those comments); implementing a decision-making process; regular communication; 
disclosure of the scheme and its standards; and periodic revision. 
During our analysis we found evidence of interaction and support between schemes, with some new schemes using 
established schemes as templates and receiving assistance from already established schemes during the start-up 
phase. For instance, RSS has been referring to some of the RJC’s mechanisms and procedures as a base to develop its 
own scheme. A similar approach was adopted by BC with regard to the RJC and the IFC’s Performance Standards. 
2.2.2 Chain of custody
This section analyses the extent to which the schemes under analysis incorporated the concept of chain of custody in 
their scope8. Figure 4 demonstrates that nine of the schemes (60%) incorporated the concept. 
There are six schemes (40%) that do not consider chain of custody. Four (27%) of those schemes are focused only on 
mining operations and one is focused only on smelters. For at least one of these schemes there is a future intention to 
move into the rest of its supply chain over time, including transport and port handling operations.
7  See for example Schiavi and Solomon (2007), Auld, Gulbrabdsen et al. (2008), Young, Fonseca et al. (2010), Blackman and 
Rivera (2011), ISEAL Alliance (2011), Barry, Cashoe et al. (2012), Manning, Boons et al. (2012), Reinecke, Manning et al. (2012), 
ISEAL Alliance (2013) and Derkx and Glasbergen (2014).
8  Chain of custody refers to the traceability of a certificate, label or claim of a product throughout its value chain, from its origin to 
its end use by retailers or consumers.
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NoYes
6 (40%)
9 (60%)
Figure 4: Percentage of schemes considering and incorporating chain of custody.
In addition, Table 4 and Figure 5 provide detailed information about the scope of each scheme analysed and the 
specific area where it operates. Eight of the schemes (53%) consider the whole chain of custody of minerals, from 
mines to final consumers and/or retailers. It is interesting to highlight that four of those schemes also considered 
within their scope the disposal and/or recycling phase of the mineral. One of the schemes applied the concept of the 
chain of custody only from the mineral extraction site to the point of export.
Table 4: Scope of the schemes along the chain of custody.
Another scheme developed a specific voluntary chain of custody standard to assist participants seeking to employ the 
chain of custody concept as a voluntary and complementary element of the scheme.
Certification Chain of Custody Mining
Processing 
facilities / Smelters
Manufactured 
Products / Traders
Retailers / 
Consumers 
Final Disposal / 
Recycling
Scheme 1 Yes
Scheme 2 No 
Scheme 3 No 
Scheme 4 Yes
Scheme 5 No 
Scheme 6 No 
Scheme 7 Yes
Scheme 8 Yes
Scheme 9 Yes
Scheme 10 No 
Scheme 11 No 
Scheme 12 Yes
Scheme 13 Yes
Scheme 14 Yes
Scheme 15 Yes
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The most common phase covered by the schemes under analysis is the mining phase, with 14 out of 15 schemes (93%) 
applying to this phase. Four of these schemes (27%) are restricted only to mining operations. One does not consider 
the concept of chain of custody within its scope but does allow participants to have each part of their chain of custody 
certified independently.
Final 
Disposal/
Recycling
Retailers/
Consumers
Manufactured
Products/
Traders
Processing
Facilities/
Smelters
Mining
14 (93)%
4 (27)%
8 (53)%
10 (67)%
12 (80)%
Figure 5:  Scope of the schemes along the chain of custody.
By incorporating the concept of chain of custody the reach of a scheme can be expanded, participants can trace the 
origin of their products, and transparency and accountability can be improved. Chain of custody provides the means 
for organisations to demonstrate their commitment to corporate social responsibility by assuring the sustainability 
performance of their supply chain (Barry, Cashore et al. 2012, Komives and Jackson 2014). Companies that make large 
purchases at the top of the supply chain can drive sustainability improvements through their suppliers. 
The schemes that adopt chain of custody assist participants to manage their risks by ensuring access to more sustainable 
supplies of natural resources and providing accountability for publicly sensitive products. Chain of custody also assists 
participants to become more familiar with the social and environmental issues of their supply chain, which can help to 
manage social, environmental and business supply risks (Barry, Cashore et al. 2012, ISEAL Alliance 2013).
2.2.3 Interoperability
This section analyses the extent to which schemes apply the concept of interoperability, which refers to whether a 
schemes recognises or references any other schemes, standards, initiatives or guidelines within their own processes. 
The vast majority of the schemes analysed (13 out of 15; 87%) reference other schemes, standards, initiatives or 
guidelines within their own scheme (Figure 6).  Those references were made through two different forms: (1) 
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acknowledging that the scheme was developed based on other schemes, standards, initiatives or guidelines; and (2) 
providing guidance to participants to consider other specific schemes, standards, initiatives or guidelines during the 
implementation and operation of a scheme. For instance, the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply 
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas was referred to by six other schemes (40%) as the 
process to follow when performing  human rights and conflict-affected due diligence. 
Other schemes, standards, initiatives or guidelines referenced in the schemes analysed include: United Nations 
Guidance on Responsible Business in Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, RJC, ICMC, ISO 9001, ISO 14001, OHSA 
18001, IFC’s performance standards, United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), UN Global Compact, Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and Equator Principles. Only two of the schemes 
(13%) analysed in this research did not refer to other schemes, standards, initiatives or guidelines.
NoYes
2 (13%)
13 (87%)
Figure 6: Number and percentage of schemes referencing other standards, schemes or guidelines.
While many schemes cross-reference other standards, there are few that cross-recognise the certificates, claims or 
labels issued by other schemes. Figure 7 shows that just five of the schemes assessed (34%) recognise the certificates, 
claims or labels issued by other schemes within their own process. For instance, CFSP, RJC, the London Bullion Market 
Association and the Dubai Multi Commodity Centre have agreed to cross-recognise assurance processes of gold 
refinery due diligence.  This initiative aims to reduce duplication for refiners and to support broader supply chain 
efforts to implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act for Conflict Minerals Provision9. Two schemes (13%) did not 
provide information on cross-recognition, a further eight schemes (53%) do not cross-recognise. One of the schemes 
not currently cross-recognising other standards is planning to do so in the future.
9  More information about the Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Act for Conflict Minerals Provision is available at http://www.sec.
gov/spotlight/dodd-frank/speccorpdisclosure.shtml. 
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Information Not AvailableNoYes
8 (53%)
2 (13%)
5 (34%)
Figure 7: Percentage of schemes recognising other certificates, claims or labels.
WWF (2013) argued that interoperability has the potential to reduce the costs of assurance. In addition to the cost 
reductions, interoperability can amplify the outcomes achieved by individual schemes as schemes coordinate and 
exchange knowledge and practices. Interoperability can also be designed to interact with governments, industry 
sectors and civil society organisations, in addition to amongst schemes themselves. Harmonization between schemes 
and regulations, laws, principles and/or initiatives already in place or under development allows schemes to further 
their reach and outcomes (Young, Fonseca et al. 2010, Stark and Levin 2011, Barry, Cashore et al. 2012, Main, Mullan 
et al. 2014). Certification schemes should ensure that their mechanisms complement regulations and/or are aligned 
with regulations rather than replacing them (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 2014). 
Interoperability also helps to avoid duplication, which can lead to inconsistencies, competition and loss of credibility. 
Also, duplication and overlapping between schemes can create confusion in the market place and/or contribute to 
greenwashing10. The divergent monitoring, reporting and assurance requirements of different schemes increase 
the cost of compliance. Interoperability is one means to improve cost efficiency and increase scheme performance 
(International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission 2004, ISEAL Alliance 
2010, Young, Fonseca et al. 2010, Stark and Levin 2011, Barry, Cashore et al. 2012, ISEAL Alliance 2013, Columbia 
Center on Sustainable Investment 2014).
The potential for integration, competition, coordination, overlap, and interaction between schemes and with 
government regulations/laws and industry and corporate standards and policies should all be considered during the 
design, development, implementation, operation and revision processes of sustainability schemes. 
10 Stark and Levin (2011) refer to the potential for greenwashing in certification through the deceptive use of aggregated data to 
indicate compliance with schemes.
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2.2.4 Type of standards
In this research we identified three broad types of criteria used within the sustainability standards analysed: (1) 
performance based, where the behaviour or outcome expected is specifically outlined; (2) management-system based, 
where the scheme measures the processes an entity has in place to manage a particular issue; and (3) combined 
approach, where both performance based and management-system based are used. 
The majority of the schemes analysed use a combined approach (12 of 15; 80%). Two schemes (13%) developed 
their criterion based on a management-system based approach, and one scheme (7%) used only performance based 
standards. 
Performance BasedManagement-System BasedCombined Approach
12 (80%)
2 (13%)
1 (7%)
Figure 8: Types of standards employed by schemes.
There are trade-offs to each type of criteria. Performance-based criteria can provide better accountability of the 
achievements of schemes, including the ability to produce measurable and quantitative results.  However, performance-
based criteria can increase costs due to increased measurement, reporting and assurance activities. Isolating the 
impacts and outcomes of a specific scheme from external factors can be very difficult (Gulbrandsen 2005, ISEAL Alliance 
2010, Track Record Global 2010, Scarlat and Dallemand 2011, Barry, Cashore et al. 2012). Management-based criteria 
are based on the idea that management practices lead to intended results. This approach assesses the management 
practices that are in place as a proxy for performance. The approach may be particularly helpful for new starters, due to 
lower costs for measurement and reporting. However, management-based criteria are not always a good substitute for 
performance and some poor performing organisations may have in place the management systems without acceptable 
results. The management-system approach can also make it difficult to clearly determine the impacts, achievements 
and results of a scheme (ISEAL Alliance 2010, Barry, Cashore et al. 2012).
A combined approach that specifies performance requirements and requires the development and implementation 
of management systems to achieve those requirements can help schemes get the best of both worlds. One scheme 
in particular initially started with management-based criteria and over time substituted some of these criteria for 
performance-based measures. 
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According to Barry, Cashore et al. (2012), the critical aspect about different types of criterion is not necessarily about the 
use of management or performance-based criterion, it is about determining correct incentives to encourage scheme 
participants to continue to improve their performance over time rather than settle at the level of a low performance 
bar. Schemes have to be flexible and have to find a balance between encouraging scheme participants to continually 
improve performance and setting achievable criterion that allows new starters and participants with financial or 
technological constraints to participate. At the same time it is important to guarantee that current scheme participants 
will not leave the scheme because the costs and efforts associated with improved performance and compliance 
become too high. 
2.2.5 Governance structure
The aspects of scheme governance analysed in this research cover five areas: the governance structure; who the 
decision makers are; how long decision makers occupy their positions; how decision makers are chosen; and if the 
names of the decision makers and the operators (secretariat) of the scheme are publicly available.
In relation to the governance structure of the schemes, the majority of the schemes (11 of 15; 73%) have a Board of 
Directors as the ultimate entity responsible for decisions (Figure 9). Five of these schemes (33%) complement their 
board of directors with committees, most often technical committees. Three schemes (20%) are governed by a steering 
committee. One scheme (7%) did not disclose information on its governance structure.
Information Not Available
Board of Directors supported by Committees
Steering Committee
Board of Directors
1 (7%)
3 (22%)
6 (40%)
5 (33%)
Figure 9: Governance structure.
All but one of the schemes analysed hosts a secretariat for day-to-day management of the scheme under the direction 
of a board of direct rs or a steering committee (14 of 15 schemes; one scheme did not disclose whether a secretariat 
was operative). One of the schemes does not run an independent secretariat. Instead the secretariat is auspiced under 
a global environmental organisation as the official coordinator of the scheme.
The second aspect of governance analysed relates to the composition of the decision makers (members of the board or 
the steering committee). Figure 10 demonstrates that five schemes (33%) have decision makers representing different 
groups of stakeholders (multi-stakeholder representatives). Five schemes (33%) have a board or steering committee 
where the majority of the decision makers are representatives of industry sectors. Three schemes (20%) do not 
provide information about their decision makers. Two schemes (13%) are composed of decision makers representing 
governments.
Information Not Available
Board of Directors supported by Committees
Steering Committee
Board of Directors
1 (7%)
3 (22%)
6 (40%)
5 (33%)
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An interesting approach was employed by one of the schemes assessed in this research project. This specific scheme, 
in order to avoid bias and improve the independence of the board of directors, does not have members of the board 
representing industries. These members are selected based on their knowledge and experience, and they serve in their 
individual capacities.
Information Not Available
Multi-Stakeholder Representatives
Government Representatives
Majority Composed by Industry Representatives
Industry Representatives
3 (20%)
2 (13%)
2 (13%)
5 (33%)
3 (20%)
Figure 10: Composition of the decision makers.
The third aspect of governance investigated was how long the decision makers occupy their position. The majority of 
schemes (10 of 15; 67%) do not publically disclose the length of the terms of their decision makers. Decision makers 
serve three-year terms in two schemes (13%), with one of these schemes allowing for the possibility of decision makers 
serving two consecutive terms. One-year, two-year and four-year terms were also in use (Figure 11).
4 Years3 Years2 Years1 YearInformation 
Not Available
10 (67%)
1 (7%)
2 (13%)
1 (7%)1 (7%)
Figure 11: How long decision makers occupy their position.
Information Not Available
Multi-Stakeholder Representatives
Government Representatives
Majority Composed by Industry Representatives
Industry Representatives
3 (20%)
2 (13%)
2 (13%)
5 (33%)
3 (20%)
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The fourth governance aspect investigated was how the decision makers are selected. Six schemes (40%) did not 
disclose information on the selection process. One scheme indicated that the process for selection was still under 
consideration.  Of the eight schemes (53%) were information was available decision makers are selected through 
election in five schemes (33%), appointed by scheme participants in two schemes (13%), and in one scheme the 
decision makers are short-listed by board members before facing election (Figure 12).
Combined Approach
Under DevelopmentElected
AppointedInformation Not Available
5 (33%)
1 (7%)
1 (7%)
2 (13%)
6 (40%)
Figure 12: How decision makers are chosen.
The majority of the schemes disclose to the public the names of the decision makers (67%; members of the steering 
committee and board of directors) and of the secretariat (73%; Figure 13). Only 5 schemes (33%) do not disclose the 
names of the decision makers and 4 schemes (27%) do not disclose the names of the secretariat.
Information Not Available Publicly Available
5 (33%)
11 (73%)
4 (27%)
10 (67%)
Decision Makers Secretariat
Figure 13: Name of the decision makers and secretariat publicly available.
A lack of transparency about how decision makers are chosen and how long decision makers occupy their position has 
the potential to impact the legitimacy of the scheme from the perspective of the stakeholders. Literature on the role of 
governance in fostering legitimacy and effectiveness indicates that transparent and accountable governance structures 
Combined Approach
Under DevelopmentElected
AppointedInformation Not Available
5 (33%)
1 (7%)
1 (7%)
2 (13%)
6 (40%)
Combined Approach
Under DevelopmentElected
AppointedInformation Not Available
5 (33%)
1 (7%)
1 (7%)
2 (13%)
6 (40%)
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increase the confidence that stakeholders and scheme participants have that their perspectives will be heard. These 
stakeholders tend to focus their efforts on the functioning of the scheme rather than on whether the scheme is 
legitimate. A governance structure that determines how objectives will be executed and outcomes will be achieved can 
help a scheme to streamline its processes and improve accountability. Therefore, an accountable governance structure 
increases the likelihood of field-level implementation, gives stakeholders confidence in the decision makers and on 
the decision making process, and minimises bias (Barry, Cashore et al. 2012, Deloitte 2012, Municipal Association of 
Victoria, Victorian Local Governance Association et al. 2012, ISEAL Alliance 2013, WWF 2013).
In addition, the governance structure can impact the robustness of the scheme (WWF 2013). The better the governance 
structure the better the development, management and operation of the scheme tends to be. A good governance 
structure is not about making correct decisions, it is about providing the best possible process for making decisions, 
giving the stakeholders the capacity to participate, or the opportunity to be represented in the decisions that affect 
their lives (Bosselmann, Engel et al. 2008, Sheng 2009, Municipal Association of Victoria, Victorian Local Governance 
Association et al. 2012, ISEAL Alliance 2013).
Governance is an instrument that aims to guarantee the sustainability of the entity over the long term and the 
achievement of its objectives, which leads to a positive influence of the entity on performance. Regardless of the 
design characteristics of the governance structure in place, schemes have to incorporate into their governance 
structure mechanisms to guarantee that they will be governed to achieve their objectives, that their key stakeholders 
are identified and engaged properly, and accountability is provided for those stakeholders. Transparency and disclosure 
of information for instance could be considered powerful instruments to improve accountability (World Bank 2005, 
International Finance Corporation and Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 2009, Columbia 
Center on Sustainable Investment 2014).
2.2.6 Oversight by external entities
Stakeholders play an important oversight role in the governance and management of many schemes. In this section 
we addresses four aspects of external oversight: the existence of external oversight by stakeholder representatives; 
the composition of stakeholders overseeing schemes; the duration of oversight roles; the selection of stakeholder 
representatives in oversight roles; and whether the names of these representatives are publicly disclosed. 
Eight schemes (53%) have a mechanism whereby stakeholder representatives play an oversight role of the scheme 
(Figure 14). Three schemes (20%) do not have external oversight and four schemes (27%) did not disclose whether 
external oversight was in place.
Information Not AvailableNoYes
4 (27%)
8 (53%)
3 (20%)
Figure 14: Existence of stakeholder representatives overseeing the scheme.
Information Not AvailableNoYes
4 (27%)
8 (53%)
3 (20%)
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The second oversight aspect investigated is the composition of the stakeholder representatives playing the oversight 
role. Of the eight schemes with an oversight mechanism three schemes (37%) have civil society representatives 
occupying these roles, two schemes (25%) have industry and civil society representatives in the roles, and one scheme 
(13%) has industry, civil society and government representatives. A further two schemes (25%) did not disclose the 
composition of the representatives overseeing the scheme (Figure 15). 
Information Not Available
Industry, Civil Society and Government Representatives
Civil Society Representatiatives
Industry and Civil Society Representatives
2 (25%)
3 (37%)
1 (13%)
2 (25%)
Figure 15: Composition of the stakeh ld r representatives oversighting the schemes.
The third aspect investigated was how long stakeholder representatives occupied the oversight roles. Seven schemes 
(87%) out of the eight schemes with an oversight mechanism did not disclose information on this aspect. Just one 
scheme (13%) disclosed that stakeholder representatives overseeing the scheme occupy their position for two year 
term, with the possibility of re-election or re-appointment, to enable continuity on standards development (Figure 16). 
Two YearsInformation Not Available
7 (87%)
1 (13%)
Figure 16: How long stakeholder representatives oversighting schemes occupy their position.
The fourth aspect investigated was how the stakeholder representatives overseeing the schemes are selected. 
Of the eight schemes with an oversight mechanism five (61%) did not disclose information about how stakeholder 
Information Not Available
Industry, Civil Society and Government Representatives
Civil Society Representatiatives
Industry and Civil Society Representatives
2 (25%)
3 (37%)
1 (13%)
2 (25%)
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representatives are selected. One scheme (13%) indicated that stakeholder representatives are elected, one scheme 
(13%) indicated that representatives are appointed by the board, and yet another scheme (13%) uses a combined 
approach (some of the stakeholder representatives are appointed by the board and some are elected; Figure 17). 
Combined Approach
ElectedAppointed
Information Not Available
1 (13%)
5 (61%)1 (13%)
1 (13%)
Figure 17: How stakeholder representatives are selected.
The final aspect of external oversight investigated was whether the names of the stakeholder representatives overseeing 
the scheme are publically disclosed. Of the eight schemes with an oversight mechanism five (71%) do not provide 
public information on the names of the stakeholder representatives, where three schemes (43%) do (Figure 18).
Information Not AvailablePublicly Available
3 (43%)
5 (71%)
Figure 18: Are the names of the stakeholder representatives publicly available.
Combined Approach
ElectedAppointed
Information Not Available
1 (13%)
5 (61%)1 (13%)
1 (13%)
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Literature on sustainability certification considers the existence of external stakeholder oversight as good practice 
governance. External oversight improves accountability and credibility of the scheme, minimises bias, scrutinises the 
work of assurance providers, provides insights about aspects not initially considered by the scheme, and can protect 
the scheme from corruption. External oversight mechanisms are generally established to represent stakeholders, and 
may play a monitoring role and/or advisory function to the scheme (Australian National Audit Office 2003, Bosselmann, 
Engel et al. 2008, ISEAL Alliance 2011, Stark and Levin 2011).    
The composition of external oversight mechanisms is also argued to be important. A multidisciplinary and independent 
external entity is fundamental to increase representativeness (Australian Public Service Commission 2007, Barry, 
Cashore et al. 2012). The diversity of perspectives improves legitimacy, and reduces the possibility for conflicts with 
stakeholders in the public domain (Gulbrandsen 2005).
2.2.7 Revision process
The slight majority of schemes assessed (9 of 15; 60%) have a process for revision of the standard and the procedures 
of the scheme in place. Four schemes (27%) did not publically disclose whether a revision process was operative and 
two schemes (13%) indicated that one was under development (Figure 19). 
Revision Process in Place
Under Development
Information Not Available
4 (27%)
9 (60%)
2 (13%)
Figure 19: Revision process in place.
The revision time-period for the nine schemes with a revision process in place, ranges between three to five years. 
Two schemes indicated that the revision process is conducted on a 3-year cycle, three schemes indicated that the 
revision process is conducted on a 5-year cycle, and one scheme indicated that the revision process is conducted on 
a 3 to 5-year cycle. In addition, three schemes demonstrate an ongoing revision process, which allows participants 
and stakeholders to provide comments about technical and administrative problems at any time. In these cases the 
comments received are addressed and accountability about how those comments were addressed is achieved through 
correspondence with the person providing the comments.
Revision Process in Place
Under Development
Information Not Available
4 (27%)
9 (60%)
2 (13%)
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Under Development
Information Not Available
4 (27%)
9 (60%)
2 (13%)
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Periodic revision is considered fundamental to guarantee the continuous improvement of the scheme. The existence of 
a periodic revision process allows the scheme to identify flaws or improvement opportunities and develop action plans 
to address those flaws and realise the opportunities. Main and Mullan et al. (2014) argue that schemes should operate 
as management systems with a periodic revision mechanism implemented to measure and monitor processes and 
results. A predefined period of revision allows the scheme to adapt and improve over time incorporating new trends, 
advances in technology, changes to the industry and the market, reform of government regulation, new expectations and 
demands, and progressive learning. The inclusion of public participation during the revision process also contributes to 
the improvement of the scheme and increases the level of transparency and accountability (International Organization 
for Standardization 1999, ISEAL Alliance 2010, ISEAL Alliance 2011, ISEAL Alliance 2013).
Schemes progressively evolve, incorporating new trends, new expectations and demands, market changes, changes in 
regulations, changes in the industry, advancements in technology and by learning through practice. 
2.2.8 Stakeholder participation in scheme development 
Four aspects were analysed regarding the involvement of stakeholders in the development phase of the schemes: 
the existence of a stakeholder engagement process during the development phase; the methods of engagement; the 
number of public consultations; and whether the identity of the stakeholder groups engaged are disclosed. 
Eight of the schemes (53%) analysed provided information on the involvement of stakeholders during the development 
of the scheme, with seven schemes (47%) not disclosing the extent of public involvement (Figure 20). 
F Information Available
Information Not Available
7 (47%)
8 (53%)
igure 20: Stakeholder involvement during the development phase of the scheme.
A variety of engagement methods were used by the schemes. Public consultation was the most common method. Of 
the schemes that indicated the involvement of stakeholders in the design phase of the scheme all invited stakeholders 
to comment on the draft standard or the schemes design. However, the number of rounds of public consultation varied 
amongst the eight schemes. Two schemes (25%) conducted only one round of public consultation, four schemes (50%) 
held two rounds of consultation, one scheme (12.5%) held three and one scheme (12.5%) disclosed that they held 
‘multiple’ rounds of consultation without providing an exact figure (Figure 21).
Information Available
Information Not Available
7 (47%)
8 (53%)
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Multiple Public Consultations
3 Public Consultations
2 Public Consultations
1 Public Consultation
1 (12.5%)
2 (25%)
1 (12.5%)
4 (50%)
Figure 21: Number of public consultations conducted.
Of the eight schemes i  which stakeholders were engaged during the development phase, a range of additional 
engagement activities accompanied the periods of pubic consultation on the draft standard or the draft scheme 
design.  Methods included workshops and roundtables, face-to-face meetings, and teleconferences. Workshops and 
roundtables were used by five schemes (28%), face-to-face meetings were used by four schemes (22%) and one scheme 
(6%) employed teleconferences to engage the public (Figure 22). 
Teleconferences
Face-to-Face Meetings
Workshops and Roundtables
Public Consultation
8 (43%)
1 (6%)
4 (22%)
5 (28%)
Figure 22: Additional mechanisms employed to engage with stakeholders.
With regard to disclosure about who was engaged the results are mixed. Only four of the schemes (27%) disclosed 
information about the type of people who were engaged, while 11 (73%) out of the 15 schemes did not provide any 
information (Figure 23). 
Teleconferences
Face-to-Face Meetings
Workshops and Roundtables
Public Consultation
8 (43%)
1 (6%)
4 (22%)
5 (28%)
Multiple Public Consultations
3 Public Consultations
2 Public Consultations
1 Public Consultation
1 (12.5%)
2 (25%)
1 (12.5%)
4 (50%)
Teleconferences
Face-to-Face Meetings
Workshops and Roundtables
Public Consultation
8 (43%)
1 (6%)
4 (22%)
5 (28%)
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Information AvailableInformation Not Available
4 (27%)
11 (73%)
Figure 23: Identity of stakeholders involved publicly available (including the names of individuals, or the names of organisations, or generic 
descriptions of stakeholder types).
The stakeholder engagement process plays a very important role in any scheme. Participation and cooperation of 
stakeholders in developing, monitoring and reviewing schemes is essential to assure the success of any certification 
scheme with high quality outputs (Round Table Codes of Conduct 2009, ISEAL Alliance 2013). The different perspectives 
and experience of diverse stakeholders can strengthen the design of standards. Engagement can also help to regulate 
or reduce conflict and improve the legitimacy of the scheme. 
However, the inclusion of divergent stakeholder perspectives, and attempts to reach consensus during scheme 
development can be challenging and can create unanticipated delays (International Finance Corporation 1998, WWF 
and World Bank 2006, AccountAbility 2008, Freeman 2009, ISEAL Alliance 2010, Barry, Cashore et al. 2012, ISEAL 
Alliance 2013). Barry, Cashore et al. (2012) argue that the content of a scheme is based on the negotiation between 
subject matter specialists and interested stakeholders. ISEAL Alliance (2013) goes further to argue that in addition to 
stakeholder participation in the development, monitoring and assurance phases, it is important to have stakeholders 
participating in governance. Through balanced input from organisations, civil society and governments, schemes can 
play a key role in addressing inequality (Giovannucci and Ponte 2005).
Barry, Cashore et al. (2012) warn that sometimes decision making based on stakeholder-driven processes can put 
stakeholders’ interests ahead of decisions related to operation and objectives of the scheme. When it comes to 
decisions about specific aspects of the operation of the schemes (e.g. pricing policies, membership strategies) the multi-
stakeholder model can make the decision making process slow. Moreover, ISEAL Alliance (2013) recommends that it 
is important to determine the most appropriate occasion to engage with stakeholders so as not engage stakeholders 
unnecessarily at the expense of efficiency.
Gulbrandsen (2005) Mueller et al. (2009) argues that fostering stakeholders’ engagement and participation improves the 
legitimacy and credibility of the schemes. When schemes are developed in a broad and inclusive process the potential 
for conflict is lower and the potential for support from stakeholders is higher (Gulbrandsen 2005). Gold (2006) cited in 
Young, Fonseca et al. (2010), (Barry, Cashore et al. 2012)emphasise the importance of non-government organisations 
and civil society in developing and contributing to the improvement of schemes. Civil society plays an important role 
influencing consumer behaviour and the purchasing habits of the public with regard to certified products.
Information AvailableInformation Not Available
4 (27%)
11 (73%)
Information AvailableInformation Not Available
4 (27%)
11 (73%)
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2.2.9 Support for stakeholder participation in development and governance
A number of schemes undertake activities and programs to foster and support internal or external stakeholders to 
participate in the development or revision of the scheme. 
While the slight majority of schemes analysed (9 of 15; 60%) do not disclose the existence of any such support, five 
schemes (33%) have training initiatives in place, two schemes (13%) run capacity building activities with participants, 
potential buyers and local communities through their regional offices, and one scheme (7%) provides financial support 
(reimbursement for travel expenses) for members of its stakeholder advisory group to attend meetings (Figure 24). 
F
Information Not 
Available
Training InitiativeFinancial SupportCapacity Building
2 (13%)
9 (60%)
5 (33%)
1 (7%)
igure 24: Initiatives in place to support participation of stakeholders in development and governance.
The accessibility of information about the schemes was also analysed. Although the majority of the schemes analysed 
are global in scope, the official websites of eight of the schemes are only available in English (53%), six schemes (40%) 
provide their official website in French, four schemes (27%) in Spanish, and two schemes (13%) in Chinese (Figure 25)11 
12 
The guidelines for five of the schemes (33%) are only available in English (33%), ten schemes (67%) also make their 
guidelines available in Spanish, six schemes (40%) in French, six schemes (40%) in Chinese and four schemes (27%) in 
Bahasa. Russian, Portuguese, Japanese, Italian, Gujarati and German languages were all used by one scheme (Figure 
26).
11  ISO’s central secretariat is located in Switzerland. However, ISO has members from 165 countries and 3368 technical bodies 
responsible to translate and keep available standards on their local languages.
12  One of the schemes analysed operates only in Australia (RSS).
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Figure 25: Languages used on the official websites. 
 Figure 26: Languages used for guidelines.
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Initiatives to support stakeholder involvement and to improve accessibility are regarded as good practice by the literature 
on the effectiveness of sustainability certification schemes. In addition to the benefits described above of stakeholder 
involvement, accessibility initiatives broaden the reach of schemes and allow for communication with communities 
that might otherwise be disengaged with the process. Accessibility initiatives help to avoid misunderstandings and 
ambiguities in interpretation, and balance other potentially contradictory sources of information (International Finance 
Corporation 1998, ISEAL Alliance 2010, ISEAL Alliance 2013, Komives and Jackson 2014).
2.2.10 Complaints and conflict resolution mechanisms
Complaints and conflict resolution mechanisms are instruments used by schemes to address concerns and avoid and 
resolve disputes. The majority of the schemes assessed (10 of 15; 67%), do not disclose the existence of a communication 
channel to receive complaints or a dispute resolution mechanism to manage and respond to those complaints. Only 
two schemes (13%) have both a complaints channel and a dispute resolution mechanism, five schemes (33%) have 
only a communication channel to receive complaints. Two schemes indicated that they were planning to implement 
complaints and dispute resolution mechanism in the future (Figure 27 and 28).
F NoYes
10 (67%)
5 (33%)
igure 27: Communication channel for receiving complaints
NoYes
13 (87%)
2 (13%)
Figure 28: Dispute resolution for handling and responding to complaints.
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10 (67%)
5 (33%)
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Complaints and dispute resolution mechanisms offer an opportunity to address issues and concerns prior to escalation 
and are important processes for demonstrating accountability (International Finance Corporation 1998, WWF and 
World Bank 2006, ISEAL Alliance 2013). These processes should be open to addressing the concerns of both internal 
and external stakeholders and be accompanied by a clear policy or procedure. A large amount of literature is now 
available about how to design rights-compatible complaints handling processes. A credible complaints and dispute 
resolution mechanism should be impartial, documented (including a registry of complaints, clear decision-making 
processes, and a record of decisions), timely, transparent and fair (International Organization for Standardization and 
International Electrotechnical Commission 1996, ISEAL Alliance 2011, International Finance Corporation 2014). 
2.2.11 Membership of a peak standard setting body
Certification schemes can themselves be based on best practices or be certified by a peak standard setting body, 
such as ISEAL Alliance or International Organisation for Standarlization (ISO). ISEAL Alliance is a global membership 
association working to improve the impact and effectiveness of sustainability certification schemes through its Codes 
of Good Practice (Assurance Code, Standard-Setting Code, and Impacts Code). ISO is a non-governmental membership 
organisation developing voluntary international standards covering different industries and activities. Some of those 
standards address practices for standardization, such as the ISO/IEC Guide 2:2004 Standardization and related activities 
and the ISO/IEC Guide 59:1994 Code of Good Practice of Standardization. Six of the schemes analysed (40%) were 
developed based on the ISEAL Alliance guidelines and two schemes (13%) are full members of ISEAL. Five of the 
schemes (34%) did not disclose whether they are associated with a peak standards setting body. Two schemes (13%) 
claimed to be developed based on best practices, but without naming the specific practices followed (Figure 29).
Figure 29 demonstrates the important role the ISEAL Alliance has been playing to influence and strengthen schemes. 
Of the schemes that provided information about their membership of a peak standard setting body, the ISEAL Alliance 
was the only body mentioned. Furthermore, the slight majority of schemes (8 of 15; 53%), were developed based on 
the ISEAL Alliance Guidelines or are full members of the ISEAL Alliance.
Information Not AvailableFull Member of the ISEAL
Based on Best PracticesBased on ISEAL Guidelines
5 (34%)
2 (13%)2 (13%)
6 (40%)
Figure 29: Member or certified by a peak certification scheme setting body. 
The use of recognised guidelines provided by peak st ndard setting bodies enhance the credibility of schemes. 
Membership represents a guarantee to stakeholders and participants that minimum aspects of quality and/or 
performance were implemented and achieved. 
2.2.12 Type of assurance
Assurance processes can be performed by a first-party, second-party, or third-party entity (or some combination of 
Information Not AvailableFull Member of the ISEAL
Based on Best PracticesBased on ISEAL Guidelines
5 (34%)
2 (13%)2 (13%)
6 (40%)
Information Not AvailableFull Member of the ISEAL
Based on Best PracticesBased on ISEAL Guidelines
5 (34%)
2 (13%)2 (13%)
6 (40%)
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these). First-party assurance refers to assessment performed by the person or organisation that provides the object 
under assurance, second-party assurance refers to assessment performed by a person or organisation that has a user 
interest in the object under assurance, and third-party assurance is the assessment performed by a person or body that 
is independent of the person or organisation that provides the object under assurance, and of user interests in that 
object under assurance (adapted from ISO and IEC, (2004). 
The majority of schemes analysed use a third party entity to provide assurance (12 of 15; 79%). One scheme (7%) 
uses a second party assurance process (participants of the scheme assuring other participants), and for one scheme 
(7%) the assurance process is still under development (Figure 30). A further scheme used a combined approach. In 
this situation, there is a requirement for an initial self-assessment to be conducted as part of the assurance process 
followed by a third party assurance. The use of a combined approach can improve the accessibility and rigor of the 
assurance process. 
Under DevelopmentCombination
Third PartySecond Party
1 (7%)1 (7%)
1 (7%)
12 (79%)
Figure 30: Type of assurance.
Assurance is considered an important aspect of any scheme. Assurance is the instrument used to assess the level of 
conformity of participants and identify situations of non-compliance (Track Record Global 2010). According to the 
ISEAL Alliance (2011), to be effective an assurance process should be in compliance with 6 principles: 
•	 Consistency: assurance should present the same results when applied in different contexts and/or when 
involving different assurance providers;
•	 Rigour: aspects related to the intensity of the assurance should be defined to determine the level of rigour of 
the assurance process;
•	 Competence: assurance should be conducted by assurance providers with competence. Assurance providers 
should have technical knowledge of both, the assurance process and sustainability certification schemes;
•	 Impartiality: the assurance process should be conducted with impartiality. Impartiality could be demonstrated 
through independence, transparency and stakeholder engagement;
•	 Transparency: the assurance process should be transparent by itself. Publically available information about the 
assurance providers, scope, sampling strategy, methodology employed, and the assurance statement can be 
provided to improve transparency of the assurance process; and
•	 Accessibility: assurance process should be affordable. 
Under DevelopmentCombination
Third PartySecond Party
1 (7%)1 (7%)
1 (7%)
12 (79%)
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12 (79%)
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The use of assurance providers to assess schemes is also an important instrument to avoid conflicts of interest, 
greenwashing and bias, enhance independency and provide accurate results (International Organization for 
Standardization 1999, Round Table Codes of Conduct 2009, Blackman and Rivera 2011, ISEAL Alliance 2011, Barry, 
Cashore et al. 2012, Komives and Jackson 2014). Schemes that make use of third-party entities to provide assurance 
tend to have a more independent assurance process than schemes that use only self-assessments or second party 
assurance. Third party assurance tends to be more rigorous because assurance providers are independent and do not 
have interests in the organisation under assurance (ISEAL Alliance 2011). On the other hand, third-party assurance 
processes are usually more costly (Barry, Cashore et al. 2012).
Although the use of third-party assurance providers is the most common practice, the combined approach can improve 
the accessibility and the rigor of the assurance process. According to (Barry, Cashore et al. 2012), a combined approach 
enables small-scale participants to share the costs of third-party assurance, which works towards accessibility. A 
combined approach can also enhance the rigor of the assurance process as two different assurance providers will 
conduct assurances of the same object.
2.2.13 Assurance frequency
The International Organization for Standardization and International Electrotechnical Commission (1996) recommends 
that certified products should be periodically evaluated to confirm that they continue to conform to the scheme. Six 
of the schemes (40%) under analysis undertake assurance on a yearly basis, three schemes (20%) undertake assurance 
every three years and three schemes (20%) did not publically disclose the frequency of assurance. Three schemes 
(7%) used a different approach whereby the frequency of assurance was based on past performance. If the assurance 
process identified major non-compliance the next assurance process is undertaken on a shorter time frame (one or two 
years). If the assurance process identified only minor non-conformance or did not identify non-conformance the next 
assurance process is conducted after three or four years. One of the schemes using performance to define frequency 
have a process whereby organisations that have demonstrated excellent compliance over many years, may be qualified 
for only “desk-top” reviews as part of a three year inspection cycle instead of full third party assurance (Figure 31). The 
use of performance to determine the periodicity of assurance rewards good performance and reduces costs.
Based on Performance3 Years
1 YearInformation Not Available
3 (20%)
3 (20%)
3 (20%)
6 (40%)
Figure 31: Assurance frequency.
2.2.14 Assurance guidance
Guidance is important for maintaining high standards in certification. Guidance may consist of definition of the scope 
of the assurance process, the procedures to be applied during assurance, the composition of the assurance team, 
Based on Performance3 Years
1 YearInformation Not Available
3 (20%)
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3 (20%)
6 (40%)
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assurance protocols and details on the format of assurance statements. The vast majority the schemes analysed 
(12 of 15; 80%) provide some form of guidance to scheme participants about how the assurance process should be 
conducted. One scheme (7%) does not provide guidance about the assurance process, and two further schemes (13%) 
do not publically disclose whether guidance is available (Figure 32).
  
No Guidance Provided
Guidance Provided
Information Not Available
2 (13%)
1 (7%)
12 (80%)
Figure 32: Assurance guidance.
The ISEAL Alliance (2011) states that schemes should define and document procedures for assurance processes and 
require that these procedures should be followed by assurance providers. Guidance should include: the frequency and 
intensity of the assurance process, the sampling protocols, the structure of the assurance team, the minimum scope 
that should be checked during assurances, the means of calculating the time needed for assurance, the documents 
to be reviewed, timelines for submission of reports and statements, and the minimum content for assurance reports 
and statements. The presence of guidance material assists to standardise expectations and outcomes. Standardisation 
helps to overcome variation in the application of the scheme and therefore improves the credibility of the process 
(Mori Junior 2014). 
2.2.15 Public availability of assurance material
Transparency is important beyond the governance of schemes and can extend to disclosure of the results of the 
assurance processes, the name of assurance providers, and the availability of the assurance report and assurance 
statement. Seven of the schemes analysed (47%) do not publically disclose whether assurance material is available, 
two schemes (13%) indicate that assurance material is not publically available, four schemes (27%) disclose only 
the assurance statements, and two schemes (13%) make available all of the assurance documents (Figure 33). The 
documents made available by these two later schemes include: the assurance statements, summaries of the assurance 
report, assurer credentials, and any action plan assumed by the organisations under assurance.
There are two main benefits to disclosing the results of assurance processes: (1) public availability allows stakeholders 
to oversee the quality of the assurance process; and (2) assurers may feel more pressure to undertake rigorous 
assurance due to the exposure. Schemes that make assurance material public are essentially adding stakeholders as 
another assurance entity. Transparency in the assurance process is advocated by a number of authors (Mueller, Dos 
Santos et al. 2009, Track Record Global 2010, WWF 2013, Mori Junior, Best et al. 2014). Mori Junior et al., argues that 
to improve industry transparency the audit process itself must be transparent. They recommend that full versions of 
the assurance statements with detailed information about the work carried out, scope, methodology used, and results 
obtained should be made available in a form that is understandable to stakeholders. WWF (2013) goes further to argue 
that audit report summaries, guidelines for auditors and board meeting minutes should also be made available to the 
public to provide transparency and facilitate the involvement of stakeholders.
No Guidance Provided
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Information Not Available
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All Assurance Material PublicOnly Assurance Statement Public
Assurance Material Not PublicInformation Not Available
7 (47%)
2 (13%)
2 (13%)
4 (27%)
Figure 33: Public availability of assurance material.
2.2.16  Assurance oversight
There are varied approaches to assurance oversight adopted by the schemes under analysis. Three schemes do not 
assume the responsibility for oversight the assurance process. Instead, two of those schemes (13%) suggest quality 
criterion that organisations looking for assurance providers should consider, while the other scheme (7%) does not 
have any procedure in place for oversight the assurance process. Ten schemes (67%) have developed an accreditation 
mechanism, where assurers, must be accredited by the scheme or by an international accreditation body in order 
to provide assurance services. Two schemes (13%) recommend experienced assurance providers that must be used. 
Four schemes (27%) review the assurance process after it has been conducted and verify the quality and depth of the 
assurance reporting before providing a certificate, claim or label. In these situations the scheme becomes the entity 
responsible for assessment of the quality of the assurance. Two schemes (13%) do not disclose how they approach 
oversight of the assurance process (Figure 34).
 F
No InitiativesDetermines
the Assurance
Provider
Suggests 
Quality Criteria
Assesses and 
Approves
AccreditationInformation Not 
Available
2 (13%)
10 (67%)
2 (13%) 2 (13%)
1 (7%)
4 (27%)
igure 34: Assurance oversight.
All Assurance Material PublicOnly Assurance Statement Public
Assurance Material Not PublicInformation Not Available
7 (47%)
2 (13%)
2 (13%)
4 (27%)
All Assurance Material PublicOnly Assurance Statement Public
Assurance Material Not PublicInformation Not Available
7 (47%)
2 (13%)
2 (13%)
4 (27%)
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Oversight of the assurance process aims to provide a minimum level of independence and quality and contributes to 
the impartiality of assurance. Regardless the type of approach adopted, schemes that oversee assurance have an extra 
mechanism to ensure quality. The oversight role should be played by a competent and impartial body (ISEAL Alliance 
2011) and the control of accreditation bodies should be consistent and on a high level (Mueller, Dos Santos et al. 2009). 
The ISEAL Alliance (2013) suggests the inclusion of stakeholders in assurance processes as an instrument of oversight. 
They also suggest: in-depth monitoring of a specific issue across assurance providers to compare and determine the 
level of competence, conducting on-site visits to clients without the assurance provider to check if the assurance 
report correlates with what is seen, interviewing clients to assess the competence of the assurance provider, reviewing 
documents obtained by assurance providers during the assurance process, reviewing client assessment reports and 
following-up on discrepancies identified during the assurance process.
2.2.17 Assurance payment
The majority of the schemes analysed (11 of 15; 73%) require the entities to be assured to be responsible for the 
contract and payment to the assurance provider. One scheme (7%) assumes the responsibility for the costs associated 
with the assurance process. This scheme uses revenue generated from membership to pay for the assurance processes. 
In this situation, the scheme is the entity responsible for identify, select, contract and pay for the assurance process. 
Three schemes (20%) do not disclose how they handle the issue of assurance payment (Figure 35).
  
Entity to be AssuredSchemeInformation Not Available
11 (73%)
3 (20%)
1 (7%)
Figure 35: Assurance payment.
The independence of the assurance process could be improved by separating the relationship between the entity 
responsible for the costs involved with the assurance process, the entity under assurance and the assurance provider. 
The ISEAL Alliance (2011) recommends that the public availability of assurance fees and sources of funding for assurance 
providers is a further means to improve transparency.
2.2.18 Support for the assurance process
Developing and implementing initiatives to support scheme participants, assurers and/or other stakeholders in the 
assurance process can help participants and schemes to achieve their goals. Four of the schemes (27%) under analysis 
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provide training material for participants about how to implement the standard, how to be prepared for assurances 
processes, and how to conduct self-assessments and pre-audits. Three of those four schemes (20%) also provide 
technical material for participants to perform self-assessments and materiality assessments, and one of those schemes, 
in addition to the technical material, also provides technical support for participants to develop and implement 
corrective actions. Self-assessments are considered an important instrument to reduce the costs of assurance and 
improve capacity building. Seven of the schemes (47%) do not provide any information about the existence of support 
for the assurance process. 
Four schemes (27%) provide financial support for early adopters or participants with financial constraints, mostly by 
defraying the costs of assurance. Two schemes (13%) encourage shared assurance processes as means to reduce costs. 
One of those two schemes (7%) recognises prior assurance undertaken on similar provisions for other schemes or 
standards to meet the assurance requirements of its own standard.
One scheme (7%) promotes the use of local assurers to reduce costs and contribute to local development. Another 
scheme (7%) uses the materiality concept to reduce the scope and thus the costs of the assurance process. Three 
schemes (20%) determine the frequency of the assurance process based on performance (Figure 36). Good performers 
have a longer time interval between assurance processes, which also reduces the assurance costs (see 2.2.13 Assurance 
frequency above).
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igure 36: Support for assurance processes.
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2.2.19 Compliance
A clear definition of the minimum requirements of compliance allows schemes to be assessed objectively avoiding 
misunderstanding, complaints and conflicts. Nine of the schemes analysed (60%) define minimum compliance 
requirements, two schemes (13%) indicate that they are under development, and four (27%) schemes do not disclose 
whether they have minimum requirements (Figure 37).
Some schemes provide detailed information about the minimum requirements of compliance in the form of guidelines, 
case examples of compliance, examples of evidence that can be used to demonstrate compliance, and advice on 
how situations of non-compliance are addressed. The definition of categories of compliance is common amongst 
the standards analysed. Common categories include: compliance, minor non-compliance, major non-compliance or 
critical breach. Some schemes differentiate compliance according to new or long-standing participants, with entry 
requirements for qualification different to progress compliance requirements after an entity has already been certified.
  F
Compliance Requirements Defined
Information Not AvailableUnder Development
9 (60%)
2 (13%)
4 (27%)
igure 37: Compliance requirements.
The establishment of compliance requirements helps to avoid deviation and guarantee that all participants that are 
deemed compliant achieved a minimum standard of performance. To be effective, minimum requirements of compliance 
should be clearly defined and verifiable (checked for compliance through an assurance process; (International 
Organization for Standardization 1999, ISEAL Alliance 2010). The achievement of minimum levels of compliance allows 
certified entities to attest to stakeholders that they have met the performance standards and improves the credibility 
of the scheme (WWF and World Bank 2006, ISEAL Alliance 2010, ISEAL Alliance 2013).  
2.2.20 Support for compliance
Initiatives that foster a higher the level of compliance by scheme participants are important tool to improve the 
accessibility of schemes and to build the capacity of participants. Four schemes (27%) have initiatives in place that 
provide new starters an extended period of time to reach compliance, two schemes (13%) provide financial support 
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for new starters and small producers located in developing countries to cover the operational costs for compliance, 
while the slight majority of schemes (9 of 15; 60%) did not disclose whether they have initiatives to support compliance 
(Figure 38). 
Training workshops to discuss implementation and compliance issues are offered by three schemes (20%). One of 
those schemes tailors training to participants after the initial compliance diagnosis. This scheme also has a pre-audit 
process to prepare participants for the assurance process. Another scheme holds training initiatives in collaboration 
with local NGOs, government representatives, international development organisations and the private sector.
Of the schemes that have initiatives in place to provide financial support to lower income and small scheme participants, 
one scheme uses a percentage of its budget to help scheme participants with financial and technical constraints to join 
and stay in the scheme, and to access technical support. This scheme recently announced a specific fund to provide 
long-term loans to small scheme participants. Another scheme offered financial support to cover assurance costs for 
the first successful assurance process. 
Komives and Jackson (2014) argue that by providing support for producers, operators and organisations to come into 
compliance is one of the most important components of any scheme. Schemes should be flexible and allow different 
approaches for different participants, and permit those scheme participants with constraints to achieve the same 
goals through different means (Waide and Bernasconi-Osterwalder, (2008). Offering price premiums for certain levels 
of compliance, assisting participants to obtain finance and manage their finances, reducing costs, providing technical 
support, and improving accessibility were also sugggested by previous studies as examples of ways to improve the level 
of compliance (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development 2008, Blackman and Rivera 2011, ISEAL 
Alliance 2011, ISEAL Alliance 2013, Komives and Jackson 2014). Without support some producers might not be able 
to overcome the barriers to certification, which may engender inequality, and lead to situations where only producers 
with financial and technological capacity can reap the benefits of being certified by a scheme.
  F
Information Not 
Available
Training Financial SupportExtended Time to be 
in Compliance
4 (27%)
2 (13%)
3 (20%)
9 (60%)
igure 38: Support for compliance.
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2.2.21 Consequences of non-compliance and sanctions
The slight majority of the schemes analysed (9 of 15; 60%) have consequences and sanctions for situations of non-
compliance. Three schemes (20%) did not disclose whether they had sanctions for non-compliance, two schemes 
(13%) indicated that this design aspect of the scheme was currently under development, and one scheme (7%) does 
not have consequences or sanctions for non-compliance (Figure 39). One scheme defines consequences not only for 
the operations of the scheme participant, but also for upstream traders and suppliers. Non-compliance by any of 
the upstream traders or suppliers automatically results in the corresponding level of non-compliance on the scheme 
participant.
The lack of consequences and sanctions in situations of non-compliance affects the credibility of schemes. Stakeholder 
attitudes and levels of trust in the scheme are affected when certified entities are not penalized in situations of non-
compliance. In addition, entities already certified and compliant can lose enthusiasm and interest in compliance with, 
which can affect the capacity of the scheme to drive improvements in performance (Partnership Africa Canada 2009, 
Stark and Levin 2011, Sharife and Grobler 2013, Acosta 2014, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 2014). 
Acosta (2014) recommends that schemes link non-compliance with sanctions. The ISEAL Alliance (2011) states that 
sanctions could be seen as an incentive to conform rather than an attempt to penalise scheme participants. Schemes 
must define and make publicly available how non-compliance should be addressed and the sanctions that should 
accompany continued non-compliance. Consequences for non-compliance are important to guarantee compliance and 
incentivize participants to ensure compliance. 
 F
Under Development
Consequences and/or Sanctions in Place
Consequences and/or Sanctions Not in Place
Information Not Available
9 (60%)
3 (20%)
2 (13%)
1 (7%)
igure 39: Consequences of non-compliance and sanctions.
2.2.22 Public financial disclosure
Public disclosure of financial information contributes to transparency and is a feature of good governance. The criteria 
that we used for analysis of financial disclosure was whether a scheme had disclosed any aspect of their finances over 
the prior year, including costs, incomes and expenditures. The slight majority of the schemes  (8 of 15; 53%), do not 
publically disclose their financial information, five schemes (34%) prepare annual reports that include detailed financial 
information and two schemes (13%) indicated that this aspect of the scheme design was still under development 
Under Development
Consequences and/or Sanctions in Place
Consequences and/or Sanctions Not in Place
Information Not Available
9 (60%)
3 (20%)
2 (13%)
1 (7%)
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(Figure 40). Only one of the five schemes that disclosed financial information within an annual report had their finances 
audited by an external auditor. Auditing by an accredited financial professional is an important governance practice 
that increases credibility and guarantees the financial position of the entity at a given date.
  Public Information Not Available
Under Development
Public Information Available
2 (13%)
5 (34%)
8 (53%)
Figure 40: Public financial disclosure.
Schemes that disclose financial information are recognised by stakeholders as more credible and accountable. Public 
disclosure of financial information aims to avoid misuse of financial resources and to ensure that potential conflicts of 
interest are identified and managed (Municipal Association of Victoria, Victorian Local Governance Association et al. 
(2012). Besides the benefits to external stakeholders, transparency around finance also improves internal management 
(Lowenstein 1996). The Instituto Brasileiro de Governança Corporativa (2010) furthermore argues that financial 
transparency also helps organisations to be understood by civil society. In addition to the financial transparency, 
reporting about problems, unachieved goals as well as successes, are essential to the development of credibility 
(Mueller, Dos Santos et al. 2009).
2.2.23 Public information about costs
The costs associated with participation in a scheme include membership, annual fees and assurance costs. Six schemes 
(40%) provide public information about the costs for participants, two schemes (13%) indicated that they do not impose 
membership fees or annual fees, and for one scheme (7%) the costs of participation were still under development. Six 
schemes (40%) do not provide information about the costs of participation (Figure 41). Aside from the benefits of 
transparency on scheme credibility, public disclosure of costs helps potential new participants to consider the costs 
associated with their potential involvement and to make long-term plans.
Public Information Not Available
Under Development
Public Information Available
2 (13%)
5 (34%)
8 (53%)
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  F
Under Development
Public Information Available
There are No Costs
Public Information Not Available
2 (13%)
6 (40%)
6 (40%)
1 (7%)
igure 41: Public information about costs associated with the scheme.
2.2.24 Effectiveness
Assessment of the effectiveness of any scheme is important not just to measure achievements and guide future im-
provement, but also to provide accountability about the scheme’s performance and to share achievements with stake-
holders and potential new participants. The ISEAL Alliance (2010) recommends that schemes should periodically re-
view their effectiveness in meeting their stated objectives. Six of the schemes assessed (40%) did not provide any 
information about the existence of mechanisms to evaluate their effectiveness, three of the schemes (20%) indicated 
there were no mechanisms in place, three schemes (20%) indicated that this aspect was currently under development, 
and only three schemes (20%) did have mechanisms in place to periodically evaluate effectiveness.
Schiavi and Solomon (2007) argue that for schemes to achieve their full potential they should have in place monitoring 
mechanisms to assess performance claims. Miller and Bush (2014) highlight the importance of collating evidence to 
back up rhetorical claims. Stark and Levin (2011) and WWF (2013) found that few schemes had properly evaluated their 
effectiveness. The three schemes analysed in this report that did periodically assess their effectiveness have designed 
and implemented different types of mechanisms. One of the schemes implemented a monitoring and evaluation 
program to assess its impacts in short, medium and long-term. Details about this monitoring and evaluation program 
are periodically published as a report that outlines a theory of change, progress towards desired outcomes, impact 
evaluations, and case studies.  
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Mechanism in Place
No Mechanism in Place
Under Development
Information Not Available
3 (20%)
6 (40%)
3 (20%)
3 (20%)
Figure 42: Mechanism in place to assess effectiveness.
Two other schemes provide periodic reports with the results of an annual monitoring and data collection process 
conducted with scheme participants. The annual reports provide information about general features of the scheme 
participants (number of producers, workers, women, size, area where participants operate, etc.), details about 
production and sales (production capacity, total volume sold, land used, etc..) and information about the premium 
payed by the schemes to scheme participants (how much scheme participants received and how the premium was 
used).
While regular monitoring and evaluation was undertaken by only a minority of schemes, there was evidence that 
schemes were undertaking ad hoc research on effectiveness. For instance, one scheme contracted a consultant company 
to perform two types of evaluation, one about the direct economic impact of gold on local and global economic 
development, and the second to compare the scheme against the OECD Responsible Supply Chain Due-Diligence 
process. Another scheme developed specific case studies where the outcomes of the scheme were assessed. While 
these examples were from schemes classified in this report as not having a regular mechanism in place to measure 
effectiveness they do indicate that a wider group of schemes are grappling with these questions. It is also important to 
mention that some schemes have not been established yet to be able to properly evaluate their effectiveness.
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3. Conclusion
Although different schemes are designed for different applications, to succeed they must be effective, transparent 
and accountable to their goals and aims. In this report we have aimed to build knowledge about the application of 
sustainability certification to the mineral industry. The literature on sustainability certification has called for more 
empirical studies on the effectiveness of sustainability certification.13 This report demonstrates that there is significant 
variation in how sustainability certification schemes in the mining industry have been designed to meet their 
objectives. Some of these differences reflect the history of the scheme, the unique geographic, industry, technology 
and demographic characteristics of the entities under certification, the level of transparency and accountability, and the 
stage of maturity or time since establishment of the initiative. However, there are areas where schemes can improve 
their effectiveness based on the knowledge outlined in existing literature. 
Effectiveness has become a topic of significant importance in sustainability certification. The assessment of effectiveness 
is important not just to measure achievements and guide future improvements, but also as an instrument to provide 
accountability to stakeholders and to encourage participation. Sharing practice between schemes will foster improved 
standards. In the next stages of this research interviews and fieldwork will be conducted to investigate how the design 
characteristics of schemes influence outcomes on the ground and the overall effectiveness of individual schemes, and 
the collective practice of sustainability certification.  
13  See for example Gulbrandsen (2005), Auld, Gulbradsen et al. (2008), Mikkilä, Heinimö et al. (2009), Blackman and Rivera 
(2011), Barry, Cashore et al. (2012), Manning, Boons et al. (2012), Reinecke, Manning et al. (2012), Delmas and Pekovic (2013) 
and Marin-Burgos, Clancy et al. (2014).
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